Water utilities undertake long term planning for water source security, often with forecast cycles of 20-30 years. Whilst this planning is generally involved with investigations of source water abstraction security and the need to build dams or to increase the recharge rate of groundwater aquifers, planning for water efficiency gains occurs at annual intervals. Most water utilities in Australia are heavily engaged in water efficiency initiatives with rebate schemes for domestic water-efficient devices being ubiquitous across the industry. Wide Bay Water Corporation (WBWC) also engages in these activities but is increasingly interested in the concept of Time of Use Tariffs (TOUTs) to target high water users in order to reduce their demand on the system. In 2006, WBWC introduced smart metering technology across the city which captures hourly use data. Interrogation of this data has led to the ability to identify water use patterns for every domestic and commercial water customer and to design specific interventions to encourage water efficiency, such as a TOUT for domestic customers. A TOUT has been developed that imposes a penalty on all individual consumption greater than 600 L in any hourly interval of any day in the year. The tariff was designed to reduce both the annual peak hour and peak day demand. The ability to reduce both of these infrastructure design parameters may have the potential to deliver substantial savings in infrastructure planning and deployment. This paper details the design process of this tariff, examines the infrastructure savings potential derived by network modelling and explores the regulatory framework hurdles to be overcome in order to implement such tariffs in the water industry.
However, the lion's share of the reduced overall domestic consumption has resulted from significantly lower irrigation demand.
Diurnal patterns and peak demand
Residential water use reflects the pattern of daily life and there is a morning and afternoon peak demand period where the highest consumption occurs during each 24 h period. Domestic water demand has been succinctly defined by MacDonald () as the interaction of three cycles plus some semi random perturbations. The first cycle is the daily life cycle revolving around work, school, etc. The second cycle is the variation attributable to weekend activities and the third cycle is the annual progression of the seasons and their influence on water use. The semi-random perturbations are the influence of weather and consumer education and conservation on water use.
People generally use the toilet, shower, have breakfast and clean their teeth before leaving for work or school and the whole pattern is more or less repeated in the afternoon when they arrive home (Kappel & Grechenig ) . The term 'peak demand' in this context refers to the consumption which occurs during peak periods. Water distribution pump, pipe and storage infrastructure is designed to provide minimum service standards for these periods, thus reductions in peak demand may have potential to save significant capital and operational expenditures. Typical daily diurnal demand patterns for week days vary from those for weekend and public holiday periods (Alvisi et al. ) . This reflects changes in routine associated with these periods.
The way most people think about the term peak demand is reflected in the definitions most often applied; something along the lines of 'highest demand during a peak period for goods or services' is usually quoted. However, the terms peak demand consumption, peak hour, peak supply and other permutations are often used interchangeably to such an extent as to be confusing. For the purpose of this study, • Peak hour demand: Peak hourly demand a system will be called on to deliver.
• Peak day demand: Maximum demand in any one day of the year.
Managing peak demand is essentially about reducing or at least putting constraints on the growth of future demand and capping the cost of infrastructure (Brooks ) .
Water demand management is defined by Brooks () as the development and implementation of strategies aimed at influencing demand, so as to achieve efficient and sustainable use of a scarce resource. Savenjie & van der Zaag () argue that peak demand management should be a primary component of any overall water demand management strategy.
The obvious implication of the variability of hourly water demand lies in the effect on the means of supply, i.e. the water distribution network from the supply reservoir onwards must be adequately sized to accommodate peak hour demand. This is particularly so in areas of high population growth where increased demand for water supply parallels the increase in the number and density of new housing estates, inevitably leading to the construction of new reticulation pipelines and eventually the upgrading of trunk mains (Brooks ).
Economic benefits from reduced peak hour demand
In water supply systems, water mains are sized to meet storage and consumption demands according to existing customer service standards plus fire flows (which is a legislative or moral obligation). Trunk mains from the reservoir and reticulation mains are designed to carry the necessary flow to meet the highest hourly peak consumption expected to occur in the course of a year. Reduced peak flow will create spare capacity in the existing reticulation infrastructure.
The following points are the central conclusions of a hydraulic modelling investigation conducted for an existing Hervey Bay District Metered Area (DMA) to model the effects of a 20% reduction in peak hour demand and to estimate the resulting capital cost savings:
For the existing demand scenario, a negligible improvement in infrastructure sizing and capital costs was achieved (i.e. $22,000 over a total of $6.3 million). This situation was due to the design requirements of the fire flow provisions 'outweighing' the total flow rate difference between actual peak hour and 20% reduced peak hour (i.e. 16 L).
For the Planning Scheme Demand (PSD) scenario where demand equals maximum system capacity during peak hour, significant improvements in infrastructure sizing and capital costs were achieved (i.e. $230,000 over $7 million). In comparison to the existing demand scenario, this improvement was predominantly due to the fact that the maximum system capacity during peak hour is significantly in excess of fire flow design requirements and therefore a 20% reduction in maximum PSD demand reduces the proportion of demand that is above fireflow requirements.
Residual capacity of the existing network was significantly improved. Approximately 650 additional Equivalent Dwelling (ED) to the existing 2,730 ED was achieved before compromising the relevant design provisions. This equates to a potential increase in water revenue of $160,000 per annum for the Point Vernon DMA examined.
Readers should note that the network solutions determined from the investigation are indicative only and were completed solely for the purpose of providing preliminary evidence to support the view that Time of Use Tariffs (TOUTs) have potential water supply system capital efficiency benefits. While the findings here are tentative and apply specifically to this situational context (i.e. one DMA in Hervey Bay) they nonetheless present evidence that reducing peak hour demand will create spare capacity in a reticulation network (23.8% more in the model above). If this spare capacity can be used to supply additional properties, for example in infill developments, there may be scope to defer trunk or reticulation main upgrades that would have otherwise been required to meet the specific DMA PSD.
Domestic water use price elasticity
According to Fan & Hyndman () there are two types of price elasticity: own price elasticity, and substitution elasticity. The latter type is more appropriate to a TOUT context. Specifically, if the price of electricity varies substantially from one time period to another and customers can shift usage among those periods, then the appropriate measure of price response is how relative usage changes in those periods.
Substitution elasticity is therefore defined as the relative change in usage in the two periods (e.g. the ratio of the peak to off peak usage) for a 1% change in the relative prices in those periods (the ratio of the off-peak to peak price).
Note that the price term uses the inverse price ratio which is why substitution elasticities are positive (e.g. a higher peak price decreases the off peak to peak price ratio, causing peak load to be reduced and therefore the peak to off peak load ratio to decline). The following price elasticity estimates have been based on own price elasticity. According to Nauges & Thomas () it may take a year or more for consumers to start responding to price change.
Overall there seems to be little consensus in current literature on the price elasticity of various types of water use except that outdoor usage is considered more elastic than indoor usage and, ultimately, price elasticity is linked to a customer's behavioural responses and socio-economic characteristics ( Jorgenson et al. ) as well as other 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The overarching goal of the research was to develop a feasible TOUT to reduce peak hour demand. Specific objectives are detailed below:
1. Determine the hourly volumetric (L) demand for combinations of common domestic water end use events.
2. Estimate the price elasticity of water outdoor water end use.
3. Design an equitable tariff to target the discretionary component of peak hour consumption.
These objectives are addressed in the tariff design section below.
TARIFF DESIGN RESEARCH FINDINGS Study sample
The implementation of a smart metering system in Hervey 
Identifying customers contributing to peak demand
Analysis showed that 217 of the residential customer connections were responsible for over half the total volume of water used during the peak hour of the peak day (i.e. 29
December 2008) and that 37.78% of all peak hour consumption (including commercial use) consisted of use by residential users at volumes greater than 600 L. It is reasonable to assume that this is predominantly outdoor use.
As outdoor use is considered the most price elastic component of domestic water use, it would seem the best solution to reducing peak hour demand is to target outdoor use during peak periods. The fact that this high outdoor component comes from a very small minority of the 2,884 residential customers in the study has lesser social equity implications than tariff structures that may target all water end use categories. There is also enough scope to achieve a 10% reduction in annual maximum peak hour consumption solely by targeting and shifting discretionary outdoor use.
Designing a tariff that targets high outdoor use
The first tariff to consider is the traditional TOUT which comprises a higher charge applied during peak periods and a much lower off-peak charge designed to entice consumers to shift consumption from peak periods to off peak periods. There may be a shoulder charge applied to the hour either side of the peak period which is designed to discourage consumers from concentrating consumption in these hours.
There are, however, two fundamental issues with a traditional TOUT. First, a peak charge is usually applied to all consumption during the peak period, including nondiscretionary water use; this would affect the 90% of residential consumers who did not contribute to peak hour demand with discretionary water use. It is difficult to justify a tariff which targets non-discretionary uses when discretionary use by a small number of consumers constitutes such a significant proportion of peak hour demand.
Secondly there is a risk that the combination of a peak, shoulder and off peak charge could concentrate outdoor consumption in shorter periods and thus serve to create alternative peaks. The risk is difficult to quantify and can really only be tested by a trial implementation of a TOUT.
A traditional type of TOUT does not seem appropriate given that it would target the non-discretionary consumption of such a large proportion of consumers. An alternative tariff is needed which specifically targets high outdoor consumption in peak periods; this can only be achieved by targeting the consumption volume ranges which were modelled to be largely outdoor use.
In effect, what is required is a tariff penalising water usage which exceeds a specific threshold volume within each hour. This tariff would include increased charges for all consumption over a certain volume in an hourly interval and could be applied during specific hours or across all hours; it is essentially an hourly inclining block tariff.
Who pays the penalty?
The peak period on the date of the annual peak hour (29 December 2008) extended from 17:00 through to 21:00 in the evening, a total of four hours. A total of 202 different customers in the study sample used water at volumes greater than 600 L/h during the peak period from 17:00 to 21:00 and the time these customers spent watering varied from 1 to 4 h. Of these, a total of 15 customers irrigated for 4 h; 19 irrigated for 3 h; 60 for 2 h and 108 for 1 h.
Further analysis of the water use of all 2,884 residential connections in the study sample over the full year showed that a small group of customers were responsible for a high proportion of consumption in volumes above 600 L/h. Table 2 shows a breakdown of the number of hours with events having water use volumes that were greater than 600 L/h for the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 (1 year period). For example, the first row of Table 2 shows 1,542 customers used water in volumes greater than 600 L/h for between 1 and 50 h each for the whole year. Only 162 connections or 5.61% of the total number of residential connections, recorded volumes greater than 600 L/h for more than 100 h in the one year study period.
This group was responsible for 49.57% of all consumption greater than 600 L/h during this period and is the logical target of a penalty tariff that has the most potential to reduce peak hour demand.
Determining a volumetric penalty charge
A volumetric penalty could initially be premised on the best available price elasticity estimates for water consumption, particularly as there is no precedent or experience to base an estimate relevant to the target group. Clearly no price elasticity research has been done in Hervey Bay; however, work has been done recently in Brisbane, a similar subtropical location, by Hoffman et al. () . This study of consumption data from various suburbs across the city arrived at a price elasticity figure of À0.507 for overall consumption;
unfortunately an extensive search of the literature produced no recent price elasticity figure for outdoor use in Brisbane.
The outdoor component may well have higher elasticity but this is the only documented figure available to derive a penalty charge which is both recent and from a location relatively close to Hervey Bay.
It may also be argued that, despite all the circumstantial evidence put forth so far supporting the hypothesis that consumption greater than 600 L/h is predominantly outdoor use, we do not really know for certain what the proportion of outdoor and indoor usage is within that volume range and therefore a price elasticity figure for overall water use is more appropriate. hourly inclining block tariff, we rely on the formula to calculate price elasticity and work backwards from the existing tariff of $1.37/kL using a 26.46% reduction in demand.
The equation to find the percentage (%) change in price required to achieve a 10% reduction in overall demand is thus:
The change in price is therefore 52.19% of the standard tariff of $1.37 and we arrive at a proposed penalty tariff charge of $2.08/kL.
Given the criteria of targeting specific consumption greater than 600 L/h, there are two basic approaches available: (1) impose the penalty tariff during specific hours of the day; or (2) impose 24 h coverage. Specific tariff models examined in this study are explored below.
Examined tariff models
Three tariff models were examined to target peak demand as follows:
• Tariff model 1: a penalty applied during peak period hours 17:00 to 21:00 only (see Table 3) • Tariff model 2: a penalty applied across all hours except the low demand early hours of the morning i.e. 0:00 to 7:00 (see Table 4) • Tariff model 3: a penalty applied across all hours of the day. (see Table 5 )
All three models are shown superimposed on an hourly consumption There is much uncertainty about the consumer response to this model as the targeted consumption may not redistribute evenly; it is possible that many customers may begin watering immediately after the peak charge has been lifted at 21:00 and thus simply move the peak in time; but this is the simplest tariff to understand and apply. Table 4 details the Model 2 Tariff. This tariff has the peak charge applied discriminately to consumption over 600 L/h during the 7:00 until 24:00 period. There is no off peak rate and the standard tariff of $1.37/kL applies to all consumption not subject to the excess consumption penalty. This model has the benefit of targeting a significant level of consumption in the greater than 600 L/h category during the 7:00 to 17:00 period. It also prevents shifting outdoor use to the period from 21:00 until 24:00.
If customers want to irrigate with volumes greater than 600 L/h they can do so during the period from 0:00 to 7:00 and avoid the peak tariff. With this tariff structure, there is still the possibility that the small number of very large users could start irrigating at the same time during the early hours when the penalty does not apply and create early morning peaks; however, any such peak would be much lower than the peak hour demand as there is very little usage at lower volumes during the early morning hours.
The third penalty tariff model is based on applying the $2.08/kL penalty tariff to all consumption in excess of 600 L across all hours of the day (Table 5) . Table 5 presents the findings of the tariff application applied to all residential consumption greater than 600 L/h during annual maximum peak day (i.e. 29 December 2008). All other consumption is charged at the standard tariff rate of $1.37/kL. This tariff is based on the assumption that an excessive consumption penalty charge will encourage all consumers to keep consumption rates at or under 600 L/h. The 24 h penalty tariff is less likely to create alternative peaks because the penalty charge is applied during all hours of the day. However, it has one significant disadvantage. With the two previous models, consumers did not need to know when they were exceeding 600 L/h because they had the option of simply avoiding irrigation during the period the penalty applied. Under the 24 h model, householders using water indoors and outdoors simultaneously would have no idea how much water was used overall in an hourly period.
Predicting shifts in consumption
Predicting customers' responses to a peak charge is very difficult; there is no way of knowing if all targeted consumption may not reappear over a very short time during periods not subject to a penalty charge.
A conservative basis for predicting the maximum number of consumers likely to use water outdoors during any 1 h period can be gained by looking at the number of consumers using water in volumes greater than 300 L/h during the peak hour.
There were 227 consumers using water at volumes greater than 300 L/h during peak hour. The first tariff model is more likely to result in an alternative evening peak because the penalty period ends at 21:00 and some consumers could still be expected to begin using water outdoors at that time. It is unlikely that these potential peaks could be as large as the annual peak hour because it is expected that at least some outdoor use would be spread over different hours and there is much less non-discretionary consumption during the late night or early morning hours. The only way of discovering if shifting outdoor use would create alternative peaks is through a trial implementation of a tariff similar to that proposed here.
Technical limitations affecting tariff design
One problem in particular with the 24 h tariff (i.e. Tariff suffer from this problem as the peak and off peak charges apply to defined hourly periods. Any consumption occurring during each hour during peak periods must be measured from the top of the hour. As a final note here, future smart metering technology will likely be able to overcome these described technical issues as it will be able to monitor running hourly intervals to capture use greater than 600 L/h (i.e. 18:42 to 19:42 instead of set hourly intervals).
Designing an equitable tariff
The result of a hypothetical penalty tariff based on $2.08/ kL and imposed on all consumption greater than 600 L/h over the period July 2008 to June 2009 (i.e. one year) is shown in Table 6. This table presents Whether applied all year round or restricted to peak periods, the tariff only has significance for the 162 large water users who constitute just 5.61% of all residential customers in the study. Note also that these 162 customers were responsible for 49.57% of all residential water use at volumes greater than 600 L/h. This simple but effective tariff design does not penalise the majority of domestic water consumers, who would be much more affected by a traditional TOUT where the peak period charge would apply to all volumes of discretionary and non-discretionary consumption.
As the goal is to target discretionary water use, the fairest and probably least difficult method would be a combination of time of use and inclining hourly block tariff such as Table 4 (Tariff Model 2) which applies a penalty charge to the period 7:00 to 12:00 leaving the early morning hours free of penalty to attract outdoor use. In this case consumers would not need to worry about whether they were exceeding 600 L/h during the hours when the penalty applied; by avoiding outdoor use during the penalty period they could be sure they were not exceeding the 600 L/h threshold.
Other alternatives include reducing the threshold for the peak penalty to 400 L or even 300 L during 
CONCLUSIONS
In summary we have examined a number of fundamental aspects of tariff reform, including price elasticity, components of domestic water consumption, and tariff design.
Examination of these aspects leads to an understanding of the type of tariff that is likely to be the most effective in driving water efficiency and reducing peak demand.
The key to an effectively priced TOUT, and the general consensus in the literature, is that outdoor water use is more price elastic than indoor use. This was to be expected as outdoor use is essentially discretionary. However, there may be significant variation in price elasticity for various types of indoor usage; personal hygiene may be the most price inelastic of all water usage (Kappel & Grechenig ) whereas water use for dish washing and washing machines may be postponed to the off peak period by many consumers.
Moreover, the literature indicates that the price elasticity for outdoor use is somewhere between À0.7 and À1.45 and for indoor use somewhere between À0.04 and À0.94. This variation may be accounted for by location, climate, water restrictions, season, socio-economic and other factors. A TOUT would therefore be most effective where residential outdoor consumption remains a significant proportion of overall consumption.
The proportion of total peak hour water consumption that could be attributed to residential outdoor use was determined in this study as 37.48%. Since outdoor use is considered the most price elastic of domestic water consumption there is ample scope for reducing peak hour consumption with a tariff targeting outdoor use.
An hourly inclining block penalty tariff which targets outdoor consumption seems the most efficient way of reducing peak hour demand and is probably the fairest tariff when considering all socio-demographic groups covering all water consumers. The proposed volumetric penalty charge was calculated on the basis of the most recent estimate of price elasticity of overall water use in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia (Hoffman et al. ) . Based on a price elasticity of À0.507, a penalty charge was calculated at $2.08/kL for every litre over 600 L to achieve a 10% reduction in overall peak hour demand.
Of the three penalty tariff hourly inclined block models considered, two targeted specific hours of the day and the third is applied 24 h of the day. These three models demonstrate the concept of an hourly threshold penalty level on an application sample of customers. There are many other permutations of this tariff design that could be devised to meet almost any circumstance. The key variables that can be modified to create alternative tariffs are the threshold level at which the penalty applies, time period the penalty charge is applied, and the rate of penalty charges applied.
The domestic tariff described here can thus meet both short and long run marginal pricing requirements as well as act as an alternative to water restriction regimes, thereby avoiding the community costs inherent in water restrictions.
